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A Tug of War: Overnight Versus Intraday
Expected Returns
Abstract
We link investor heterogeneity to the persistence of the overnight and intraday compo-
nents of returns. We document strong overnight and intraday firm-level return continuation
along with an offsetting cross-period reversal effect, all of which lasts for years. We look for
a similar tug of war in the returns of 14 trading strategies, finding in all cases that profits
are either earned entirely overnight (for reversal and a variety of momentum strategies) or
entirely intraday, typically with profits of opposite signs across these components. We ar-
gue that this tug of war should reduce the effectiveness of clienteles pursuing the strategy.
Indeed, the smoothed spread between the overnight and intraday return components of a
strategy generally forecasts time variation in that strategy’s close-to-close performance in a
manner consistent with that interpretation. Finally, we link cross-sectional and time-series
variation in the decomposition of momentum profits to a specific institutional tug of war.
JEL classification: G02, G12, G23, N22
1 Introduction
A textbook approach to asset pricing uses the representative investor framework in which
agents are assumed to be essentially identical. Though elegant and intuitive, a large body
of empirical research has documented failures of this paradigm to explain stylized market
facts (Cochrane 2004, Campbell forthcoming). Based on those failures, a natural extension
is to allow for investor heterogeneity.1 However, since heterogeneity may affect asset prices
in a variety of (unobservable) ways and since the specific differences studied in the prior
literature provide only a modest improvement in explanatory power, it remains challenging to
understand what investor differences are particularly important and exactly why (Cochrane
2017).
We provide new insights to these issues by introducing a novel way to measure the
importance of heterogeneity in asset markets. Our starting point is that one may be able
to identify the relevance of different types of agents simply through the fact that they tend
to trade at different times during the day. For example, and as the primary focus in our
analysis, some investors may prefer to trade at or near the morning open while others may
prefer to trade during the rest of the day up to and including the market close. Since
these two periods– when the market is open vs. when it is closed– differ along several key
dimensions, including information flow, price impact, and borrowing costs, it seems likely
that many aspects of investor heterogeneity that might be relevant for asset pricing also
manifest themselves as a tendency to trade in one of these periods rather than the other.
In this light, the presence of “overnight”and “intraday”clienteles seems a reasonable and
perhaps even natural starting point.
We thus view the overnight and intraday components of returns as potentially reflecting
the specific demand by the corresponding clientele. Under this interpretation, stocks that
experience relatively strong overnight or intraday returns do so in part because of temporary
demand (and thus price pressure) from the clientele in question. To the extent that clientele
order flow is persistent, stocks that outperform overnight, for example, should, on average,
continue to perform relatively well overnight in the future. Furthermore, that price pressure
(to the extent that it is not fully informative) must eventually reverse, and is more likely
to do so during subsequent intraday periods when the opposing clientele dominates market
activity. In other words, any back-and-forth, or tug of war, across the two periods reflects
1Harrison and Kreps (1978) study how heterogeneous beliefs can affect asset pricing. Constantinides and
Duffi e (1996) study the importance of heterogeneity in investor consumption in understanding key asset
pricing facts. Garleanu and Panageas (2015) use heterogeneity in investor preferences to shed light on asset
pricing issues. He and Krishnmurthy (2013) model the importance of investor type, specifically focusing on
the role of intermediaries.
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and reveals the relative importance of the overnight / intraday clienteles.
We take this new way of thinking about markets to the data, providing the first study of
the persistence and reversal patterns of these basic components of close-to-close returns.2 We
show that stocks with relatively-high overnight returns over the last month have, on average,
relatively-high overnight returns as well as relatively-low intraday returns in the subsequent
month. Our findings are economically and statistically significant; a portfolio that buys the
value-weight overnight winner decile and sells the value-weight overnight loser decile has a
three-factor overnight alpha of 3.47% per month with an associated t-statistic of 16.83 and
a three-factor intraday alpha of -3.02% per month (t-statistic of -9.74).
This tug of war can be identified using either component of close-to-close returns. Stocks
with relatively-high intraday returns have, on average, relatively-high intraday returns cou-
pled with relatively-low overnight returns in the subsequent month. A portfolio that buys
the value-weight intraday winner decile and sells the value-weight intraday loser decile has
a three-factor intraday alpha of 2.41% per month (t-statistic of 7.70) and a three-factor
overnight alpha of -1.77% per month (t-statistic of -7.89).
Though these monthly patterns are striking, more surprising is the fact that they persist
even when we lag our intraday/overnight return signals by as much as 60 months. In-
deed, the corresponding t-statistics for the resulting joint tests are well over 20. Of course,
transaction costs will make the actual profitability of a trading strategy exploiting these
overnight/intraday patterns much less attractive. But the magnitude of the t-statistics com-
bined with the fact that consequences of the tug of war we identify still can be measured
years later strongly confirm that the patterns can neither be a statistical fluke nor a man-
ifestation of some high-frequency market microstructure effect. We argue that these novel
patterns instead represent a fundamental economic phenomenon in the market and may shed
insight on the importance of clienteles in driving the variation in expected returns.
Although we do not observe the fundamental drivers of these intraday/overnight investor
clienteles, we conjecture that a part of this persistent investor preference/demand in these
two periods can be tied to various firm characteristics. For example, some investors may
be particularly averse to idiosyncratic risk overnight, and therefore (always) reduce their
exposure to high-idiosyncratic-volatility stocks shortly before market close; consequently,
we may observe different return patterns associated with idiosyncratic volatility during the
intraday vs. overnight periods.
More specifically, we decompose the abnormal profits associated with a standard list
of firm characteristics (that are known to forecast future close-to-close returns) into their
2All our results shown below are robust to different definitions of open and close prices, as well as excluding
small-cap stocks.
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intraday and overnight components. By doing so, we deliver new evidence about the cross-
section of average returns through a careful examination of exactly when expected returns
accrue. We find that 9 of the 14 strategies we study earn their entire premia intraday
(including size which is weak in our sample, yet only marginally fails to achieve intraday
significance at conventional levels - see footnote 14). The five exceptions to this finding are
all strategies based on past returns (or their close cousin, earnings announcements) —four
momentum strategies (price, industry, earnings, and time-series momentum) and the short-
term reversal effect. These five strategies all earn their premia overnight. More formally, we
can easily reject the hypothesis that returns to the strategies we study are evenly distributed
across these two periods. Furthermore, we show that our results are not attributable to
macroeconomic or firm-specific news announcements.
In addition, we consistently find an overnight/intraday tug of war in strategy risk pre-
mia. For all strategies that earn statistically significant premia intraday (value, profitability,
investment, market beta, idiosyncratic volatility, equity issuance, discretionary accruals and
share turnover), there is an economically and statistically significant overnight premium that
is opposite in sign; in other words, a positive risk premium is earned overnight for the side of
the trade that might naturally be deemed as riskier. Our results thus reveal that these clas-
sic asset pricing anomalies are in fact primarily intraday anomalies in the sense that their
overnight returns arguably make much more intuitive sense. Unfortunately, our tests are
unable to link this cross-sectional variation in average overnight returns to a formal model
of risk, but we hope that this is a promising avenue for future research.
We next exploit these strategy-specific tug of wars to reveal the relative attractiveness of
these strategies going forward. We motivate this approach with intuition from a simple model
of limits of arbitrage, based on Gromb and Vayanos (2010), that we provide in the Internet
Appendix. As is typically the case in that class of models, since arbitrageurs are risk-averse,
demand by uninformed investors has price impact and results in abnormal trading profits
going forward for those arbitrageurs. In particular, the larger the uninformed demand, the
larger the abnormal trading profits for arbitrageurs.
Our insight is simply that different times of the trading day will naturally have differing
levels of participation by arbitrageurs and that these differences should reveal the magnitude
of the uninformed trading demand, all else equal. For example, if uninformed demand is
rather low, prices will move only slightly in the direction of that demand at the open and
then partially revert as more arbitrage capacity enters the market. The tug of war will
then be relatively small. If uninformed trading demand is instead rather high, prices will
move strongly in the direction at the open. Prices will revert at the close as more arbitrage
capacity comes in, but as the logic in the previous paragraph points out, will settle at a
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higher price then before the arrival of uninformed demand.3 Consequently, when the relative
magnitude of the demand is particularly high, we should be able to observe a large realized
tug of war which should forecast larger than usual returns to betting against uninformed
demand going forward.
Based on this motivation, we use the smoothed past realized overnight and intraday re-
turn components of strategies in a variable we dub TugOfWar (defined in equation (1) in
section 4.4 below) to forecast the strategies’close-to-close returns going forward. Our hy-
pothesis is that the smoothed past overnight minus intraday return spread should positively
forecast subsequent returns of strategies whose average returns accrue primarily overnight
(momentum and short-term reversal) and negatively forecast returns on strategies with av-
erage returns that accrue primarily intraday (size, book-to-market, profitability, investment,
beta, idiosyncratic volatility, issuance activity, accruals, and turnover).
Our results show that TugOfWar forecasts subsequent close-to-close returns just as
hypothesized and is robust to controls for a host of popular well-known timing variables.
These controls include both aggregate variables such as the lagged 12-month market return
and market volatility, and strategy-specific variables such as the smoothed past close-to-close
return on the strategy, the strategy’s characteristic spread, and the difference in short interest
between the strategy’s long leg and short leg. The results are not only statistically significant
but also economically important. For a typical strategy in our sample, a one-standard-
deviation increase in TugOfWar forecasts a 1% higher close-to-close strategy return, or
about 18% of its monthly return volatility.
Finally, we zoom in on one of the most widely-used signals, price momentum, to provide
more direct evidence of the clientele mechanism. Motivated by recent work from Lou and
Polk (2013), we study the way preferences of institutions to trade momentum stocks vary
through time and across stocks and whether this variation corresponds to the overnight-
intraday return decomposition of this strategy. We study institutions as a source of clienteles
as it is reasonable to suspect that this group may have particular preferences, not only in
terms of whether they buy or sell momentum stocks but also in terms of when they prefer
to trade. We therefore link institutional activity to our momentum decomposition in two
steps.
We first examine when institutional investors likely initiate trades. Specifically, we link
changes in institutional ownership to the components of contemporaneous firm-level stock re-
turns and find that institutional ownership increases more with intraday than with overnight
3There are two opposing forces in these sorts of limits to arbitrage models. On the one hand is the
magnitude of the uninformed demand. On the other hand is the risk tolerance of the arbitrageurs. Generally
speaking, we are interested in how the net difference between these two opposing forces varies through time.
For ease of exposition, we focus on the uninformed demand varying through time.
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returns. To the extent that collective trading can move prices, this evidence is consistent
with the notion that institutions tend to initiate trades throughout the day and particularly
at the close while the opposing clientele (individuals) are more likely to initiate trades near
the open. Indeed, institutions may be forced to trade intraday given the larger quantities
they tend to trade and the greater liquidity present at that time. Our understanding is
that many managed execution systems purposefully avoid the open given the relatively high
volatility brought about from large customer orders and news from the overnight period.4
We confirm these patterns using TAQ data; large trades (linked to institutions) are more
likely to occur near the close while small trades (linked to individuals) are more likely to
occur near the open.
We next study the extent to which institutions, relative to individuals, trade momentum
stocks. We find that on a value-weight basis (i.e., weights proportional to total assets),
institutions as a whole trade against the momentum characteristic. Of course, this does not
preclude a subset of institutions, for example mutual funds, from following a momentum
strategy (see Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1995) and particularly so for certain stocks
at certain times, a point that we exploit.
We condition both our trading and decomposition results on two key variables. The first
variable is a time-series measure of the degree of investment activity in momentum strategies
introduced by Lou and Polk (2013). The second variable is a cross-sectional measure of the
aggregate active weight (in excess of the market weight) of all institutions invested in a stock,
which is likely related to institutions’rebalancing motives.
Either in the time series, when the amount of momentum activity is particularly low, or in
the cross-section, when the typical institution holding a stock has a particularly strong need
to rebalance, we find that momentum returns are relatively more negative during the day
(when institutions actively put on their trades) and relatively more positive overnight. Both
sorting variables generate variation in the spread between overnight and intraday momentum
returns on the order of 2% per month.
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates our work and briefly
summarizes existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes. A broad set of auxiliary results
and robustness checks are provided in an Internet Appendix.
4We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
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2 Motivation and Related Literature
Though we are the first to measure the persistence of the intraday and overnight components
of firm-level returns, we argue that such a decomposition is a natural one as these two periods
are different along several key dimensions.
One key difference between these two periods is that much of the overnight return may
reflect more firm-specific information. The United States stock market is open from 9:30
am to 4:00 pm but a significant portion of earnings announcements occurs outside of these
times. More generally, firms tend to submit important regulatory filings after the market
has closed.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that the overnight return is predominantly driven
by trading of investors less concerned with liquidity and price impact. Of course, after-
hours trading is much thinner than trading while markets are open. Moreover, the pre-open
auctions on the NYSE and NASDAQ only average anywhere from one to four percent of
median daily volume, depending on the type of stock. Finally, trading in the first half hour
of the day (the interval in which we measure the open price), though substantial, is still
significantly less than the volume one observes intraday, particularly near or at the close.5
Alternatively, trading at the close could reflect trades that are not purely information-
based. Presumably, many of these trades are made to rebalance portfolios that were pre-
viously optimal but no longer are. Indeed, some intraday trading may be a result of in-
stitutional capital flows. Perhaps some institutional investors’mandates effectively require
capital to be invested immediately in the strategies those investors pursue, once that capital
arrives.
Researchers have shown since at least Fama (1965) that volatility is higher during trad-
ing hours than non-trading hours.6 Recent work by Kelly and Clark (2011) suggests that
aggregate stock returns on average are higher overnight than intraday.7 To our knowledge,
we are the first paper decomposing firm-level returns as well as the returns to popular char-
acteristics into their overnight and intraday components. By providing this evidence, our
decomposition brings new and important constraints to risk-, intermediary-, or behavioral-
based explanations of these empirical regularities.
5Consistent with this idea, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) find that though prices are more effi cient and
more information is revealed during the day, an after-hours trade, on average, contains more information
than a trade made when markets are open.
6See also French (1980) and French and Roll (1986).
7See related work by Branch and Ma (2008), Cliff, Cooper, and Gulen (2008), Tao and Qiu (2008),
Berkman et al. (2009), and Branch and Ma (2012).
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3 Data and Methodology
Our core CRSP-Compustat US sample spans the period 1993 to 2013, constrained by the
availability of TAQ data. We augment these data with information on institutional ownership
from Thompson Financial. In our robustness tests, we also use international data from
Thomson Reuters Tick History.
To decompose the close-to-close return into its overnight and intraday components, we
use the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) in the first half hour of trading (9:30 am -
10:00 am) as reported in TAQ.8 We rely on VWAP to ensure that our open prices are robust.
To further safeguard against the possibility that our VWAP may be driven by very small
orders, we exclude observations where there are fewer than 1000 shares traded in the first
half hour (we have also checked that our results are not sensitive to this restriction.)
We first measure the amount of trading activity associated with our VWAP price by
decomposing dollar trading volume over 30-minute intervals throughout the trading day. In
particular, each month, we sum up the number of dollars traded in each of these half-hour
windows. Note that the first half-hour window that starts at 9:30 am also includes the open
auction and the last half-hour window that starts at 3:30 pm also includes last-minute (i.e.,
4:00 pm) trades. We then compute the fraction of total daily volume (i.e., the sum over
these 13 windows) that is accounted for by each 30-minute interval. Figure 1 displays the
time-series average of these fractions. Consistent with previous research, trading activity
dips during the day and then rises near the close. The percent of dollar trading volume from
9:30 am - 4:00 pm that takes place in the first 30-minute window is 14.25%.
For each firm i, we define the intraday return, riintraday,s, as the price appreciation between
market open and close of the same day s, and impute the overnight return, riovernight,s, based









In other words, we assume that dividend adjustments, share splits, and other corporate
events that could mechanically move prices take place overnight.9 Furthermore, to ensure
8We have also verified that our results are robust to using open prices from other sources: a) open prices
as reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) which also starts in 1993 (since their
data are sourced from TAQ), b) the first trade price from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, and c)
the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread at the open. Our findings are robust to using these alternative
proxies for the open price (results available upon request).
9We know of no violation of this assumption in our sample. However, we have redone our analysis
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that the returns are actually achievable, if the open price on day s for a particular stock
is missing (which happens very rarely as we exclude small-cap stocks from our sample), we
hold the overnight position from the closing of day s−1 to the next available open price. Put
differently, we construct our return measures such that the overnight and intraday returns
aggregate up to exactly the close-to-close return. Though conceptually clean, this aspect of
our methodology has no appreciable impact on our relative decomposition of average returns
into their overnight and intraday components.








(1 + riovernight,s)− 1,
(1 + riintraday,t)(1 + r
i
overnight,t) = (1 + r
i
t).
Thus, all of our analysis examines the intraday and overnight components of the standard
CRSP monthly return, rit.





























the interaction term), so our portfolio decomposition does not sum exactly to the close-to-
close return. This discrepancy is small and can be easily backed out from our tables.
The main objective of this study is to examine expected returns during the overnight vs.
intraday periods. In these tests, we always exclude microcap stocks– i.e., those with a price
below $5 a share and those whose market capitalization is in the bottom NYSE size quintile–
from the sample to mitigate microstructure issues. We decompose holding-period returns
on simple value-weight long-short portfolios where breakpoints are always based on NYSE
percentiles. We also decompose holding period returns generated by Fama-MacBeth (1973)
excluding months in which dividends are paid, and our results are nearly identical.
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WLS regressions (where the WLS weights in each cross-sectional regression are proportional
to market capitalization). These regressions allow us to carefully decompose partial effects.
We report hypothesis tests as to whether overnight and intraday average returns are equal
(both as a whole and on an hourly basis) in the context of our Fama-MacBeth analysis.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Persistence in Components of Trading Strategy Returns
We believe it is reasonable that some investors prefer to trade more intensively around the
market open, while others prefer to trade intensively later in the day. If the firm-specific
order flow of such clienteles is persistent, then one should see persistence in overnight and
intraday returns as well as a cross-period reversal (to the extent that the demand is not
fully informative). Thus, we check for the existence of intraday and overnight clienteles
by decomposing past returns into overnight and intraday components and looking for these
continuation and reversal patterns.
We first look for these patterns linking one month to the next. In Table I, at the end
of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged one-month overnight
returns (Panel A) or lagged one-month intraday returns (Panel B). In each sort, we then
go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. We report
monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the
three-factor model.
We find extremely strong results. A hedge portfolio based on past one-month overnight
returns earns an average overnight excess return of 3.47% per month with an associated
t-statistic of 16.57. This finding continues to hold regardless of the risk adjustment as the
three-factor alpha is also 3.47% per month (t-statistic of 16.83). This finding is accompanied
by a corresponding reversal in the intraday period. The one-month overnight return hedge
portfolio earns an average intraday excess return of -3.24% per month with an associated
t-statistic of -9.34 (three-factor alpha of -3.02% per month with a t-statistic of -9.74).
This tug of war can be identified using either component of close-to-close returns. If we
instead sort stocks based on past one-month intraday returns, the resulting hedge portfolio
earns an average intraday excess return of 2.19% per month with an associated t-statistic of
6.72. As before, adjusting for three-factor exposure does not substantially reduce the effect;
indeed, the three-factor alpha is higher at 2.41% per month (t-statistic of 7.70). Again, we
find a corresponding reversal in the overnight period as this one-month intraday return hedge
portfolio earns an average overnight excess return of -1.81% per month with an associated
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t-statistic of -8.44 (three-factor alpha of -1.77% per month with a t-statistic of -7.89).
In untabulated results, we confirm that these results are robust to replacing the VWAP
open price with the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread at the open. In particular, the
portfolio based on past one-month overnight returns has an overnight three-factor alpha of
1.88% (t-statistic of 8.75) and an intraday three-factor alpha of -1.43% (t-statistic of -7.05).
Similarly, the portfolio based on past one-month intraday returns has an intraday three-factor
alpha of 1.35% (t-statistic of 4.86) and an overnight three-factor alpha of -0.85% (t-statistic
of -3.31). Given these results, we feel confident that bid-ask bounce is not responsible for
our findings.
Heston, Korajczyk, and Sadka (2010) (henceforth HKS) document a statistically signifi-
cant positive relation between a stock’s return over a half-hour interval and the corresponding
half-hour return occurring on each of the next 40 trading days and argue that their patterns
are consistent with investors having a predictable demand for immediacy at certain times.
However, HKS do not study how their half-hour intraday momentum effects aggregate or
whether they persist beyond two months and, more importantly, do not study overnight
returns at all.
Nevertheless, to confirm that our findings are more than just a simple aggregation of the
HKS half-hour effect, we include in our subsequent Fama-MacBeth regressions (discussed in
the next section and presented in Table IV) the most recent one-month intraday return as a
control for the HKS finding. We continue to find that both the past intraday and the past
overnight returns independently forecast next month’s intraday and overnight components.
Though our results are distinct from HKS, we do explore how the contribution to the
intraday persistence and overnight reversal varies across the HKS half-hour intervals. Ap-
pendix Table A1 documents that returns within any half-hour interval strongly negatively
forecast next month’s overnight return as well as strongly positively forecast next month’s
intraday return. We find no obvious pattern in forecasting strength, however, across these
13 half-hours of the trading day.
With such high t-statistics, it is very unlikely that the results are spurious; nevertheless, to
confirm that these striking overnight/intraday momentum and reversal patterns are robust,
we replicate our analysis in nine large non-US equity markets, again focusing on value-weight
portfolios. Those markets are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia,
Hong Kong, Japan, and South Africa. Appendix Table A2 Panel A reports our findings.
For this sample, there is no short-term reversal effect in close-to-close returns. This lack
of a close-to-close effect hides strong patterns within the overnight and intraday periods that
are further sharpened by examined sorts on return components. Specifically, in every country,
we find a strong one-month overnight continuation effect. On a value-weighted basis across
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countries, a simple strategy that buys last-month’s overnight winners and sells last-month’s
overnight losers earns an overnight premium of 2.31% with an associated t-statistic of 6.90.
Similarly, in each of the nine countries, we find a strong one-month intraday continuation
effect. Across countries, the value-weight average intraday return of buying last month’s
intraday winners and selling last month’s intraday losers is 2.80% (t-statistic of 6.23). As
in the US, we also find a strong cross-period reversal in every country that is statistically
significant and roughly equal in absolute magnitude.
Our interpretation of these findings is that certain clienteles persistently trade certain
stocks in the same direction in the first half hour after market open, while others trade
later during the day, which is why we see this strong persistence in overnight and intraday
returns. If so, then these patterns should persist. As a consequence, Figure 2 reports
how the t-statistics associated with the four strategies analyzed in Table I evolve in event
time. Consistent with this interpretation, for each of the four strategies, t-statistics indicate
statistical significance up to five years later.
The international findings are similarly persistent. To highlight this fact, we com-
pute exponentially weighted moving average overnight (EWMA_NIGHT ) and intraday
(EWMA_DAY ) returns (with a half-life of 60 months and skipping the most recent month
to ensure we are not simply repackaging the one-month result documented above) and use
these variables to forecast subsequent overnight and intraday returns in each of these mar-
kets. Appendix Table A2 Panel B documents that on a value-weighted basis across countries,
EWMA_NIGHT forecasts next month’s overnight return with a t-statistic of 5.10 while
EWMA_DAY forecasts next month’s intraday return with a t-statistic of 4.60. We also find
a strong cross-period reversal. On a value-weight basis across countries, EWMA_NIGHT
forecasts next month’s intraday return with a t-statistic of -3.38 while EWMA_DAY fore-
casts next month’s overnight return with a t-statistic of -3.74.
Appendix Table A3 applies our EWMA approach to the half-hour returns studied in
Appendix Table A1 and generally finds that the low-frequency component in each of the 13
half-hour intervals is independently informative about next month’s overnight and intraday
returns. The sole exceptions are that the EWMA of past 10:30 am - 11:00 am returns
does not independently forecast subsequent overnight returns and that the EWMA of past
1:00 pm - 1:30 pm returns does not independently forecast subsequent intraday returns. Of
course, since we are examining 13 half-hour intervals, we are still strongly able to reject the
null hypothesis that the 13 intraday coeffi cients are jointly < 0 as well as the null hypothesis
that the 13 overnight coeffi cients are jointly > 0.
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4.2 The Cross-Section of Expected Return Components
Given these remarkable patterns, we use our new approach to understand the importance of
clienteles for expected close-to-close returns on popular trading strategies. Specifically, we
decompose the abnormal profits associated with a long list of trading strategies —size, value,
price momentum, earnings momentum, industry momentum, time-series momentum, prof-
itability, investment, idiosyncratic volatility, beta, turnover, equity issuance, discretionary
accruals, and short-term reversals —into their intraday and overnight components. In each
case, we simply report the average CAPM alphas of the overnight and intraday components
of the zero-cost strategy; please see Appendix Table A4 for the average excess returns, CAPM
alphas, and, when appropriate, three-factor alphas on both the long and the short sides of
these strategies. All of our conclusions are robust to these different risk adjustments.
The equity premium
As a benchmark, we first decompose the equity premium into its overnight and intraday
components. Table II reports that the market portfolio (CRSP ) as measured by the value-
weight CRSP universe has an average monthly intraday excess return of 0.38% and an average
overnight return of 0.55%. This breakdown lines up pretty well with one simply based on the
percentage of time corresponding to each of these two periods. Specifically, the US market
is open for approximately 27% of the 24-hour day and the premium earned then is roughly
40% of the total. As we shall soon see, the decomposition results for the popular trading
strategies we study are all very far from this natural benchmark.
Our findings are, on the surface, inconsistent with previous work that has argued that
the equity premium is primarily an overnight phenomenon. However, much of that research
bases their conclusions on narrow market proxies like an ETF tracking the Dow 30. In
Appendix Figure A1, we compare an annualized version of our decomposition of the CRSP
value-weight index against a similar decomposition of a value-weight portfolio of the top 1%
stocks of the NYSE sample (similar to the Dow 30). The figure shows that for the largest
stocks, essentially all of their risk premium is earned overnight. This result foreshadows our
next finding that the well-known small-stock effect is entirely an intraday phenomenon.
Size, value, and momentum
We examine three well-known strategies that capture the average returns associated with
size and value (Fama and French 1992) and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).10 We
10Fama and French (1992) argue that size and the book-to-market-equity ratio describe the cross section
of average returns, subsuming many other related characteristics. Fama and French (1993) propose a three-
factor model that includes not only a market factor but also a size and value factor. Fama and French (1996)
argue that these factors price a variety of trading strategies except for the momentum effect of Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993). See Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (forthcoming) for a comprehensive analysis of
how these patterns and the subsequent anomalies we study can or cannot be explained by intertemporal
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first examine a strategy (ME) that goes long the small-stock decile and short the large-stock
decile. Table II reports the overnight and intraday components of ME’s CAPM-adjusted
returns. Essentially all of the size premium occurs intraday. Specifically, the intraday CAPM
alpha is 0.43% (t-statistic of 1.85) while the overnight CAPM alpha is only 0.11% (t-statistic
of 0.75).
We next decompose the returns on a strategy (BM) that goes long the high book-to-
market decile and short the low book-to-market decile. We measure book-to-market-equity
ratios following Fama and French (1992). Again, we find that essentially all of the value
premium occurs intraday. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is 0.48% (t-statistic of
2.21) while the overnight CAPM alpha is actually slightly negative, though not statistically
significant (-0.10% per month, t-statistic of -0.67).
We then decompose the returns on a standard implementation of the classic momentum
strategy, MOM , of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) where we measure momentum over an
eleven-month ranking period and then skip a month before forming portfolios. In sharp
contrast to the findings for size and value, essentially all of MOM’s returns are generated
overnight. Specifically, the overnight CAPM alpha is 0.98% (t-statistic of 3.84) while the
intraday CAPM alpha is only -0.02% (t-statistic of -0.06).11
Although all momentum profits occur from the closing price to the opening price, the
overnight return onMOM is much less volatile (4.02% standard deviation) than the close-to-
close return (7.85% standard deviation). Thus, the Sharpe Ratio of the overnight return on
MOM is 0.77, more than twice as high as the Sharpe Ratio of the close-to-close return (0.31).
Interestingly, on average, more of the negative skewness observed in momentum strategies
(Daniel and Moskowitz 2013) and present inMOM arrives intraday rather than overnight.12
Given that momentum differs dramatically from size and value as well as the other strategies
we study below, the Internet Appendix provides various additional robustness tests and
auxiliary analyses in Tables A10, A11 and A12.
Earning Momentum, Industry Momentum, and Time-series Momentum
We next examine three other momentum strategies to document whether our finding that
momentum profits accrue overnight continues to hold. Table II decomposes the abnormal
returns on an earnings momentum strategy (SUE). Our earnings momentum characteristic
is simply the difference between reported earnings and the consensus forecast; this difference
is scaled by the firm’s stock price. As with price momentum, we find that 100% of the
asset pricing.
11We follow the standard approach in the literature by examining monthly holding periods on momentum
strategies. However, our results are robust to different holding periods (see Appendix Figures A2 and A3
and the related discussion).
12Overnight MOM returns have a skewness of -1.08 while the skewness of intraday MOM returns is -1.53.
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returns to SUE occur overnight. In particular, the CAPM alpha of a long-short earnings
momentum portfolio is 0.56% with a t-statistic of 3.20. The corresponding intraday CAPM
alpha is indistinguishable from zero.
We then decompose the abnormal returns on an industry momentum strategy (INDMOM).
We follow Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and measure industry momentum over a twelve-
month ranking period for 20 industries based on SIC codes. Again, we find that 100% of the
INDMOM effect occurs overnight. In particular, the overnight CAPM alpha of a long-short
industry momentum portfolio is 1.07% with a t-statistic of 6.47. The corresponding intraday
CAPM alpha is quite negative at -0.63% (t-statistic of -2.03).
Finally, in Table III, we examine the intraday and overnight returns of Moskowitz, Ooi
and Pedersen’s (2012) time-series momentum strategy applied to a universe of 22 of the
most liquid futures on international equity indexes. Note that Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen
study 59 future contracts spanning all asset classes, but since equity markets are the focus
of our paper, we restrict our attention only to futures on equity indexes, which is also
appropriate because “intraday” and “overnight” periods are much more well-defined for
equity markets than they are for, say, USD/Yen currency futures. We list the markets we
study in Panel B of the table. As with cross-sectional momentum, time-series momentum
occurs entirely overnight. Table III Panel A documents that for our sample, the monthly
overnight CAPM alpha associated with time-series momentum is 1.40% with a t-statistic of
3.24. The corresponding intraday alpha is negative, economically negligible, and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. These conclusions are robust to controlling for the Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model. Interestingly, all of this strategy’s negative return skewness comes
from its intraday component.
In summary, for the four different momentum strategies studied in this paper, all of
the abnormal profits occur overnight. Indeed, in the case of industry momentum, more
than 100% of the close-to-close premium accrues overnight, as there is a partially-offsetting
negative intraday premium.
Profitability and Investment
Researchers have documented that several other characteristics generate cross-sectional
variation in average returns. Chief among these characteristics are profitability —introduced
by Haugen and Baker (1996), confirmed in Vuolteenaho (2002), and refined in Novy-Marx
(2013) —and investment —introduced by Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) and carefully
analyzed in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). Indeed, Fama and
French (2015) grant that two factors based on profitability and investment help describe the
cross section of average returns, even in the presence of their value factor, HML.
We examine a profitability or return on equity strategy (ROE) that goes long the high
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profitability decile and short the low profitability decile. Table II reports the overnight and
intraday components of ROE’s CAPM alpha. More than 100% of the profitability premium
occurs intraday as ROE has a very strong negative overnight CAPM alpha. Specifically,
the intraday CAPM alpha is 1.42% (t-statistic of 5.58) while the overnight CAPM alpha is
-0.95% (t-statistic of -6.25).
We then examine a strategy (INV ) that goes long the low investment decile and short
the high investment decile. Table II reports the overnight and intraday components of
INV ’s CAPM alpha. We find that more than 100% of the low investment premium occurs
intraday as there is a statistically significant negative CAPM alpha associated with INV
overnight. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is 0.97% (t-statistic of 4.39) while the
overnight three-factor alpha is -0.28% (t-statistic of 2.10).
Beta and Idiosyncratic Volatility
The next two strategies we study relate to traditional measures of risk. The fundamental
measure of risk in the asset-pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972)
is market beta. However, empirical evidence indicates that the security market line is too
flat on average (Black 1972 and Frazzini and Pedersen 2014).
We examine a strategy (BETA) that goes long the low-beta decile and short the high-
beta decile. We measure beta using daily returns over the last year in a market model
regression. We include three lags of the market in the regression and sum their coeffi cients
to take nonsynchronous trading issues into account (Dimson, 1979). Table II reports the
overnight and intraday components of BETA’s CAPM alpha. More than 100% of the
low-beta premium occurs intraday as there is a negative premium on our BETA strategy
overnight. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is 0.70% (t-statistic of 2.40) while the
overnight CAPM alpha is -0.49% (t-statistic of 2.17).
We next analyze a strategy (IV OL) that goes long the low idiosyncratic volatility decile
and short the high idiosyncratic volatility decile. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)
argue that high idiosyncratic stocks have abnormally low returns. We measure idiosyncratic
volatility as the volatility of the residual from a daily Fama-French-Carhart four-factor re-
gression estimated over the prior year. Table II documents that more than 100% of the
IV OL premium occurs intraday. As a consequence, IV OL has a negative risk premium
overnight. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha for IV OL is 2.48% per month with an
associated t-statistic of 6.21. The corresponding overnight CAPM alpha is -1.46% per month
with a t-statistic of -5.23.
Equity Issuance and Discretionary Accruals
Our next group of strategies are related to firm financing and accounting decisions. Daniel
and Titman (2006) show that issuance activity negatively predicts cross-sectional variation in
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average returns. Sloan (1996) documents a strong negative correlation between discretionary
accruals and subsequent stock returns. We first examine a strategy (ISSUE) that goes long
the low-equity-issuance decile and short the high-equity-issuance decile. Table II reports
the overnight and intraday components of ISSUE’s CAPM alpha. More than 100% of
the issuance premium occurs intraday; ISSUE has a very strong negative overnight CAPM
alpha. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is 1.13% (t-statistic of 6.13) while the overnight
CAPM alpha is -0.52% (t-statistic of 3.27).
We then examine a strategy (ACCRUALS) that goes long the low discretionary accruals
decile and short the high discretionary accruals decile. Table II reports the overnight and
intraday components ofACCRUALS’s CAPM alpha. Again, more than 100% of the accruals
premium occurs intraday as there is a statistically significant negative overnight CAPM
alpha associated with the ACCRUALS strategy. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is
1.10% (t-statistic of 4.73) while the overnight CAPM alpha is -0.47% (t-statistic of 3.25).
Turnover and One-month Return
The final two strategies we study relate to liquidity and price impact. Datar, Naik and
Radcliffe (1998) show that turnover (TURNOV ER) is negatively related to the cross-section
of average returns, and this finding is confirmed in Lee and Swaminathan (2000). Jegadeesh
(1990) shows that buying (selling) short-term losers (winners) is profitable.
We first examine a strategy (TURNOV ER) that goes long the low turnover decile and
short the high turnover decile. We measure turnover following Lee and Swaminathan (2000)
as the average daily volume over the last year. Table II reports the overnight and intra-
day components of TURNOV ER’s CAPM alpha. Again, more than 100% of the negative
turnover premium occurs intraday as there is a statistically significant negative expected
return associated with TURNOV ER overnight. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is
0.57% (t-statistic of 2.58) while the overnight CAPM alpha is -0.29% (t-statistic of -1.98).
We finally analyze a strategy (STR) that goes long the low past one-month return decile
and short the high past one-month return turnover decile. Table II reports the overnight
and intraday components of STR’s CAPM alpha. Note that we find no short-term reversal
close-to-close effect, which is perhaps not surprising given that we exclude microcaps from
our sample, form value-weight portfolios, and study a relatively recent time period. However,
what is surprising is that our decomposition reveals a strong overnight reversal and a slightly
stronger negative expected return associated with STR intraday. Specifically, the intraday
CAPM alpha is -1.05% (t-statistic of -3.25) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.93%
(t-statistic of 4.28).
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Though portfolio sorts are useful as a robust, non-parametric approach to document
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the link between a characteristic and the cross-section of average returns, this approach
has diffi culty controlling for more than just a very small number of other characteristics
and thus makes measuring partial effects problematic. As a consequence, we turn to Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions to describe the cross-section of overnight versus intraday
expected returns. Observations are weighted by lagged market capitalization in each cross
sectional regression to be consistent with our portfolio analysis. Columns (1) through (3)
of Table IV report the following three regressions: a standard regression forecasting the
cross-section of rclose−to−close, a regression forecasting the cross-section of rovernight, and a
regression forecasting the cross-section of rintraday. In each regression, we include all of the
characteristics studied above except for earnings momentum, as it reduces the number of
observations in each cross-section considerably. Also, for ease of comparison to previous
results, we use the raw characteristic, distinguishing the variable from the strategies in the
above analysis by the use of lowercase. Thus, for example, we expect a negative coeffi cient
on size in the regressions in Table IV, just as we expected a positive CAPM alpha on the
SIZE strategy in Table II that was constructed to buy small stocks and sell large stocks.
To confirm that our findings are distinct from those in section 4.1, we include in the
regressions in Table IV the most recent one-month intraday return (ret_day), the most
recent one-month overnight return (ret_night), and both ewma_night and ewma_day
defined in the previous subsection.13
Regression (1) shows that, for our sample, only ret_day, inv, and issue are statistically
significant (on a value-weighted basis).14 Regression (3) reveals that many of these charac-
teristics are much stronger predictors of the cross-section of intraday returns. In fact, size,
ivol, turnover, inv, and issue are all statistically significant and beta and roe are marginally
significant. Consistent with the results from our portfolio sorts, the sign on ret_day flips to
be positive and statistically significant. There are negative intraday mom and bm effects,
though the estimate on the latter is not significant at the five percent level.
In the cross-section of overnight returns described by regression (2), mom is very strong.
Consistent with the results in previous tables, there is a strong positive premium associated
13Appendix Table A5 reestimates these regressions dropping ret_day, ret_night, ewma_night, and
ewma_day, and including the past one-month return, ret1
14Several papers are consistent with our finding that the partial effects associated with size and bm are
relatively weak in our post-1992 sample that focuses on relatively large stocks. In terms of size, Schwert
(2003) argues that the small-firm effect disappeared shortly after the publication of Banz (1981). Moreover,
Horowitz, Loughran, and Savin (2000) argue that stocks with less than $5 million in market cap are entirely
responsible for the small firm effect. Our data filters remove those stocks from our sample so we would
expect a weaker size effect. In terms of value, Fama and French (2015) state in the abstract of their paper
proposing a five-factor asset pricing model that “With the addition of profitability and investment factors,
the value factor of the FF three factor model becomes redundant for describing average returns in the sample
we examine.”
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with ivol and turnover and a strong negative premium associated with roe. The positive
premium for beta is large but only marginally statistically significant. Interestingly, there is
a positive premium for size and bm. Overall, these regressions are broadly consistent with
our main findings.
It is worth emphasizing that these regressions control for the persistence finding of Sec-
tion 4.1, in the sense that characteristics predict return components even though the re-
gressions include lagged firm-level component returns (ret_day, ret_night, ewma_night,
ewma_day). Moreover, ret_night, ret_day, ewma_night, and ewma_day all continue to
strongly predict overnight and intraday returns in the same way as the results in Figure 2.
In particular, we find that ewma_night predicts subsequent overnight and intraday returns
with a coeffi cient of 16.8 (t-statistic of 6.00) and -21.7 (t-statistic of -5.22) respectively while
ewma_day forecasts subsequent intraday and overnight returns with a coeffi cient of 10.4
(t—statistic of 3.39) and -15.6 (t-statistic of -3.42) respectively. We have also estimated this
regression skipping either two or three months and the results are largely unchanged.15
Testing for statistical differences between overnight and intraday overnight premiums for
Fama-French-Carhart anomalies
Regressions (4) and (5) present the main statistical tests of our decomposition of the
cross-section of average returns. Regression (4) tests the hypothesis that the overnight and
intraday partial premiums for a particular anomaly are equal. We easily reject a joint test
of that null. Regression (5) tests the hypothesis that the overnight and intraday partial
premiums for each anomaly are proportional to the corresponding percentage of the 24-hour
day. We easily reject a test that this is jointly true across the anomalies in question.
4.3 Return Component Patterns Not Explained by News An-
nouncements
Macroeconomic news
Scheduled macroeconomic announcements are made both when markets are open and
when they are closed, in roughly equal proportions. Of course, particular announcements
may be particularly relevant in terms of cross-sectional differences in risk. We take a first
step in analyzing whether exposure to macroeconomic news can explain the cross-section of
overnight versus intraday returns by examining the cross-sectional response to a macroeco-
nomic announcement that has been shown to be relevant for the market as a whole, namely
15If we skip two months, the corresponding coeffi cients are 15.8 (t-statistic of 5.77), -19.0 (t-statistic of
-5.33), 10.4 (t-statistic of 3.90), and -11.8 (t-statistic of -3.30). If we skip three months, the corresponding
coeffi cients are 14.1 (t-statistic of 5.36), -17.4 (t-statistic of -5.04), 9.5 (t-statistic of 3.66), and -10.6 (t-statistic
of -3.24).
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the announcement from the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Lucca
and Moench (2015) show the market response to macro announcements documented in Sa-
vor and Wilson (2014) exclusively comes from the FOMC announcement and occurs during
the 2pm-to-2pm period prior to the scheduled FOMC announcements. Since the market re-
sponse is quite strong and covers both an intraday and overnight period, this announcement
has the potential to uncover differences in risk across these periods for momentum, size, and
value strategies.
Appendix Table A6 Panel A reports the overnight and intraday components for the day
of the announcement as well as the days before and after the announcement for the charac-
teristics studied above. We find no statistically significant differences in average returns for
any of the strategies. Only BETA, IV OL, and ISSUE have statistically significant aver-
age returns over these days, and there is no obvious pattern within the intraday/overnight
periods for these characteristics.
Firm-specific news
One clear difference between the intraday and overnight periods is that a significant
portion of firm-specific news tends to be released after markets close. Appendix Table
A6 Panels B and C examine the role of news announcements. Consistent with Engelberg,
McLean, and Pontiff (2017), we find that there is a statistically significant abnormal return
on announcement days for most of the strategies we study. However there is no clear pattern
in terms of the overnight and intraday components of these average abnormal returns. We
find that BM , MOM , and STR have all of their earnings announcement premia realized
intraday. In contrast, we find that ROE, IV OL, and ACCRUALS have their earnings
announcement premia realized overnight. Finally, TURNOV ER and ISSUE essentially
have their earnings announcement premia realized evenly across the overnight and intraday
periods. More broadly, Appendix Table A6 Panel C documents that there is no statistical
difference between news and non-news months.
4.4 Forecasting Close-to-close Strategy Returns with the Tug of
War
As argued in the introduction, one way of thinking about our documented intraday/overnight
spread in various return anomalies is that there are different investor clienteles: while some
investors bet against the anomaly in question, others trade in the opposite direction, thus
helping create and prolong the anomalous pattern. To the extent that these different clien-
teles have varying degrees of trading intensities during the day vs. at night, our novel
overnight/intraday return decomposition provides new insights into their collective behavior
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and subsequent strategy performance.
Consider modeling uninformed traders and arbitrageurs trading at the open and close.
Though some arbitrageurs participate at both times of the day, there is more capacity at
the close. To fix ideas, think of a positive demand shock from these uninformed traders.
That shock results in overpriced assets, as arbitrageurs are risk averse. Given the relatively
light participation by arbitrageurs at the open, prices first react strongly to the uninformed
demand and then revert to a lower, though still overpriced level at the close. The price
does not fully return to the true value at the close as arbitrageurs must be compensated for
bearing the risk.
Of course, larger demand shocks will have a larger price impact as arbitrageurs will
require additional compensation for the additional liquidity they provide. Thus, both the
initial back and forth from the open to the close as well as the subsequent return from the
close will be higher, all else equal. We develop this model (based on the work of Gromb and
Vayanos, 2010) and formally prove this claim in the Internet Appendix.
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where the overnight and intraday components of returns, rsovernight,t and r
s
intraday,t, are defined
in section 3. We choose a smoothing parameter λ that is consistent with a half-life of 60
months (our results are robust to other half-lives).16
By defining TugOfWar in this way, the coeffi cient in the regression forecasting the






is predicted to be positive regardless of whether the strategy in question is an overnight or
intraday strategy.
We also include in the regression a corresponding exponentially weighted moving average
16We set the initial value of rs,EWMAintraday,t and r
s,EWMA
overnight,t to the first observation of the corresponding com-
ponent of a strategy’s returns.
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(EWMA) of the lagged monthly close-to-close strategy returns and monthly daily strategy
return volatility. Finally, we also include in the regressions a host of other controls in-
cluding the lagged 12-month market return and market volatility, the characteristic spread
between the strategy’s long lag and short lag, and the difference in short interest between
the strategy’s long leg and short leg.17
As shown in Table V, our measure of a strategy’s tug of war forecasts subsequent close-to-
close strategy returns just as predicted. All but one of the anomalies have the predicted sign
for the forecasting coeffi cient, and six of the eleven anomalies are statistically significant.
We can easily reject the null hypothesis that the forecasting coeffi cients are jointly zero
(p < 0.01). In terms of economic importance, for the average strategy in our sample, a
one-standard-deviation increase in its TugOfWars forecasts a 1.01% higher close-to-close
strategy return, or about 18% of its monthly return volatility.
4.5 Price Momentum and the Institutional Tug of War
Building on our general measure of investor heterogeneity, we next turn to a specific case
of clientele trading to shed more light on the price momentum effect. To this end, we focus
on two specific clienteles, individuals vs. institutions, who have different preferences for
momentum characteristics and tend to initiate trades at different points in a day.
4.5.1 Evidence from Recent US data
When do institutions trade?
We first study when institutional investors tend to trade. Figure 3 provides suggestive
evidence that small trades occur more near the market open while large trades occur more
near the market close. Specifically, this figure reports dollar trading volume of large vs. small
orders over 30-minute intervals as a fraction of the daily volume for the period 1993-2000.
Following previous research, we define small orders as those below $5,000 and large orders as
those above $50,000. We end our analysis in 2001 as this link between trade size and investor
type no longer holds because large institutions began splitting their orders post-2000. Since
institutions tended to submit large orders while individuals tended to submit small orders,
these results are consistent with the view that institutions tended to trade at market close
and individuals at market open.18
17Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) use the value spread to forecast time-series variation in expected
returns on value-minus-growth strategies. Lou and Polk (2014) show that the formation spread in the mo-
mentum characteristic forecasts time-series variation in expected returns on momentum strategies. Hanson
and Sunderam (2013) document how time-series and cross-sectional variation in short interest forecasts
strategy returns.
18Though we follow the literature in assuming that institutions did not consistently break up their trades
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For broader evidence over our full sample, we link changes in institutional ownership to
the components of contemporaneous firm-level stock returns. In Table VI Panel A, we regress
quarterly changes in institutional ownership on the overnight and intraday components of
contemporaneous returns.19 We examine this relation across institutional ownership quintiles
as we expect the result to be stronger for the subset of stocks where institutions are more
important. We find that for all but the lowest institutional ownership quintile, institutional
ownership increases more with intraday rather than overnight returns.
To the extent that investors’collective trading can move prices, this evidence suggests
that institutions are more likely to trade significantly after the open while individuals are
more likely to initiate trades near the open. Of course, one could argue it is hard to know
how to interpret these correlations because institutional trading can both drive stock re-
turns and react to stock returns within the quarter. Three reasons suggest that alternative
interpretation of our results is unlikely.
First, our result is consistent with the usual understanding as to how these two classes
of investors approach markets. Professional investors tend to trade during the day, and
particularly near the close, taking advantage of the relatively higher liquidity at that time.
Conversely, individuals may be more likely to evaluate their portfolios in the evening after
work and thus may tend to make trades that execute when markets open. Our discussions
with asset managers indicates that the typical manager does not trade at the open.
Second, a reverse causality interpretation of our findings in Table VI seems theoretically
implausible. It would be odd that institutions chase only intraday returns but not overnight
returns since the close-to-close returns are what is important in theories predicting such
behavior (e.g. window dressing as in Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny 1991).
Third, we confirm our key result in alternative data, specifically, using high-frequency
daily institutional flows from Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009). We find that our
results continue to hold and, in fact, are statistically speaking much stronger. Table VI
Panel B shows that for all but the lowest institutional ownership quintile, daily institutional
ownership increases much more with intraday rather than overnight returns.
What types of stocks do institutions trade?
We then examine whether institutions trade with or against the momentum characteristic,
both on average and conditional on key indicators. In particular, we forecast quarterly
changes in institutional ownership using a firm’s momentum characteristic.
before 2001, it might be the case that institutions choose to trade smaller amounts at or near the opening,
e.g. because of higher volatility or less liquidity at those times. Figure 3 should therefore be interpreted as
somewhat speculative but suggestive evidence consistent with the more detailed forthcoming evidence below.
19Each panel of Table VI only shows the top and bottom quintiles. Please see Appendix Table A7 for the
results for all quintiles.
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In Table VII Panel A, we estimate both OLS and WLS (with weights tied to a firm’s
lagged market capitalization) cross-sectional regressions and report the resulting Fama-
MacBeth estimates. We first focus on the unconditional results, reported in columns (1)
and (3). When we weight firms equally, we find no relation between a stock’s momentum
characteristic and its subsequent change in institutional ownership. Since our analysis of
returns mainly relies on value-weight portfolios, we also examine the results when we weight
observations by market capitalization. In this case, we find that institutions collectively trade
against the momentum characteristic. The estimate is -0.260 with an associated standard
error of 0.119. Of course, since a decrease in institutional ownership is an increase in individ-
ual ownership, these findings suggest that, on average, individuals, relative to institutions,
are the ones trading momentum.
These findings are consistent with Gompers andMetrick (2001) who find a strong negative
cross-sectional relation between momentum and institutional ownership. Of course, a subset
of institutions may follow a momentum strategy and be particularly important either at
certain times or for certain stocks. Below, we exploit two variables, comomentum and
active weight that arguably proxy for variation in momentum trading by institutions. We
also discuss the relationship between price momentum and size, since institutions are likely
more active in larger stocks.
Comomentum forecasts time-variation in price momentum component returns
Lou and Polk (2013) propose a novel approach to measuring the amount of momentum
trading based on time-variation in the degree of high-frequency abnormal return comovement
among momentum stocks, dubbed comomentum. This idea builds on Barberis and Shleifer
(2003), who argue that institutional ownership can cause returns to comove above and beyond
what is implied by their fundamentals.20 Lou and Polk confirm that their measure of the
momentum crowd is a success based on three empirical findings. First, comomentum is
significantly correlated with existing variables plausibly linked to the size of arbitrage capital.
Second, comomentum forecasts relatively low holding-period returns, relatively high holding-
period return volatility, and relatively more negative holding-period return skewness for the
momentum strategy. Finally, when comomentum is relatively high, the long-run buy-and-
hold returns to a momentum strategy are negative, consistent with times of relatively high
amounts of momentum investing pushing prices further away from fundamentals.
Columns (2) and (4) in Table VII Panel A report the results from forecasting the
time-series of cross-sectional regression coeffi cients using comomentum. For robustness,
20Recent work by Anton and Polk (2014) uses a natural experiment to confirm that institutional ownership
can cause this sort of comovement. Lou (2012) shows that mutual fund flow-induced trading could also lead
to excess stock return comovement.
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we simply measure comomentum using tercile dummies. Consistent with the interpretation
that comomentum measures time-variation in the size of the momentum crowd, we find
that institutions’tendency to trade against the momentum characteristic is decreasing in
comomentum. The effect is statistically significant for both the OLS and WLS estimates.
Table VII Panels B and C explore the implications of this result for our decomposition of
momentum profits. In particular, we partition the data into three subsamples based on the
relative value of comomentum. Following Lou and Polk (2013), we track the buy-and-hold
performance of MOM for two years following portfolio formation. Our prediction is that
periods when comomentum is low are times when institutions as a whole trade especially
strongly against momentum. As a consequence, momentum profits should be stronger and
the momentum tug of war (the difference between overnight and intraday average returns)
should be larger.
That pattern is exactly what we find. When comomentum is low, we find that the
overnight excess returns to momentum strategies are particularly strong in both Year 1 and
Year 2 after classification. However, when comomentum is high, overnight excess returns
turn negative. The difference in the average monthly overnight return to momentum across
high and low comomentum states of the world is -1.56% in Year 1 and -2.26% in Year 2.
Both estimates are jointly statistically significant (t-statistics of -2.22 and -4.05 respectively).
A corresponding comomentum effect can be seen in the average intraday returns to mo-
mentum. When comomentum is low, we find that the intraday excess returns to momentum
strategies are particularly negative in both Year 1 and Year 2. However, when comomentum
is high, these excess returns turn positive. The difference in the average monthly intraday
return to momentum across high and low comomentum states of the world is 1.11% in Year
1 and 0.86% in Year 2. Both estimates are jointly statistically significant (t-statistics of 1.79
and 2.04 respectively).
Active weight forecasts the cross-section of price momentum component returns
The second key indicator we use is the aggregate active weight in a stock. We measure
active weight as the difference between the aggregate weight of all institutions in a stock and
the weight of the stock in the value-weight market portfolio. We conjecture that a relatively
large active weight will indicate a preference by those institutional investors to rebalance
toward market weights, due to risk management concerns such as keeping within tracking
error targets. To illustrate, imagine that institutions collectively overweight stock S. If the
stock goes up (down) in value relative to the market, institutions will have an even larger
(smaller) weight in S, and will thus trade in a contrary manner to keep their tracking error
small. The reverse is true for an initial underweight in stock S.
Columns (2) and (4) in Table VIII Panel A report the results from cross-sectional re-
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gressions forecasting quarterly changes in institutional ownership using a firm’s momentum
characteristic, active weight, and the interaction between these two variables. For robust-
ness, we simply measure active weight using quintile dummies.
Consistent with our conjecture that institutions with high active weight in a stock are
reluctant to let their positions ride, we find that institutions’tendency to trade against the
momentum characteristic is increasing in active weight. The effect is statistically significant
for both the OLS and WLS estimates.
Table VIII Panels B and C explore the implications of this result for our decomposition
of momentum profits. In particular, we independently sort stocks on momentum and active
weight into quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints and form 25 value-weight portfolios. Our
prediction is that stocks with low active weight are stocks where institutions as a whole par-
ticularly trade against momentum. As a conseuqence, momentum profits should be stronger
and the momentum tug of war should be larger.
Again, that pattern is exactly what we find. When active weight is low, we find that the
overnight excess returns to momentum strategies are relatively weak the next month. When
active weight is high, however, overnight returns become strongly positive. The difference
in the average monthly overnight return to momentum across high and low active weight
stocks is 1.15% with an associated t-statistic of 5.39.
A corresponding effect can, again, be seen in the average intraday returns to momentum.
When active weight is low, the average intraday excess returns to momentum strategies are
close to zero. However, when active weight is high, these average excess returns become
quite negative. The difference in the average monthly intraday return to momentum across
high and low active weight stocks is -0.76% with an associated t-statistic of -2.70.
Summary
Whether or not institutions are momentum traders is an important research question in
finance. Despite the importance of this question, there is no clear consensus; the answer
appears to depend on both the type of institution being studied and the sample in question.
For our data, we find that on average, institutions tend to trade against momentum.21 More-
over, there is interesting time-series and cross-sectional variation in institutional momentum
trading that goes hand-in-hand with variation in the decomposition of momentum profits
into overnight and intraday components.
Namely, in the time series, when the amount of momentum trading activity is particularly
low, or in the cross-section, when the typical institution holding a stock has a particularly
21Our results are consistent with the findings of Badrinath and Wahal (2002), who show that institutions
tend to be momentum traders when they open new positions but are contrarian when they adjust existing
ones.
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strong need to rebalance, we find that institutions trade more strongly against momentum
and that momentum returns are even larger overnight and more strongly reverse during the
day. Both cases generate variation in the spread between overnight and intraday returns on
the order of two percent per month.
4.5.2 Price Momentum Decomposition Varies with Size: Non-US and pre-1962
evidence
In Appendix Table A10, Panels C and D we report that the spread between overnight and
intraday price momentum returns is much stronger for large stocks relative to small stocks.
While we believe the comomentum and active weight measures are better proxies for variation
in institutional trading than market capitalization, it is worth noting that results using this
measure also agree with our previous findings. This agreement is particularly important
because the price momentum - capitalization relationship can be explored in data samples
for which our sharper proxies are unavailable, and in this subsection we confirm that the
size-momentum component relationship is stable across all samples we consider.
Evidence from non-USMarkets To provide further evidence of our finding that momen-
tum profits, particularly for stocks held by institutional owners, accrue primarily overnight,
we decompose profits to momentum strategies in the nine non-US equity markets studied
above. A significant challenge in decomposing momentum profits in non-US markets is the
availability of reliable data for open prices. We obtain that data from Thomson Reuters
Tick History database, which provides comprehensive microsecond tick data for markets
around the world since 1996.22 To construct an open price, we followed our US method and
computed a VWAP price for each stock.
Appendix Table A8 Panel A reports our findings. The left-side of the Table reports
results for the full sample of stocks, while the right side of the Table reports results for
large-cap stocks. Of course, large-cap stocks are much more likely to be held by institutions.
For the full sample, we find that momentum in non-US markets is primarily an intraday
phenomenon. For eight of the nine countries in our sample, intraday momentum profits are
larger than overnight momentum profits. Indeed, only two countries, Australia and South
Africa, have positive overnight momentum profits that are statistically significant. A value-
weight average of the close-to-close momentum profits is 1.28% per month (t-statistic of
2.55) with 0.96% (t-statistic of 3.62) accruing intraday and only 0.23% (t-statistic of 0.58)
accruing overnight.
22When processing the data, we also compared our accurate measures of open prices to those found on
Datastream. Our analysis indicated that Datastream open prices can be quite misleading.
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The results change dramatically for the large-cap sample. Now, six countries have
overnight momentum profits that are larger than the corresponding intraday profits. For
all six of these countries, the overnight component of momentum profits is economically and
statistically significant. Only one country, Germany, has large-cap momentum returns that
are statistically significant intraday. A value-weight average of the close-to-close momentum
profits for the large-cap sample is 1.24% per month (t-statistic of 2.17) with a statistically-
insignificant 0.44% (t-statistic of 1.24) accruing intraday and a statistically-significant 0.80%
(t-statistic of 2.50) accruing overnight.
As a consequence, the change in the overnight and intraday components as one moves
from the full sample to the large-cap sample goes the right way in terms of our institu-
tional clientele interpretation and is quite statistically significant. Specifically, the overnight
component increases by 0.57% (t-statistic of 3.13) and the intraday component decreases by
0.52% (t-statistic of -2.78). This difference-in-difference test is consistent with our conjecture
that we should expect momentum to be more of an overnight phenomenon among stocks
with a larger institutional presence.23
We also extend our industry momentum results to non-US markets. Our focus is on
four market regions (North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa) to ensure reasonably large
industry cross sections. We find strong evidence that industry momentum is an overnight
phenomenon. Appendix Table A8 Panel B shows that across these four regions, the average
monthly close-to-close return is 1.01% per month (t-statistic of 2.67) with 0.90% (t-statistic
of 3.35) accruing overnight.
Evidence from pre-1962 US Markets Open prices are also available from CRSP,
sourced from the Wall Street Journal, for the 36-year period of 1927-1962. Of course, these
prices do not have the nice feature of the VWAP approach used in the rest of our analysis
in that they do not necessarily represent traded prices. Nevertheless, this sample provides a
potentially useful placebo test of our hypothesis that institutional ownership is responsible
for the overnight momentum pattern, as institutional ownership was very low for all but the
largest stocks. Indeed, Blume and Keim (2014) indicate that institutions, roughly speaking,
held only five percent of equity during most of this time. Consistent with that observation,
Panel A of Appendix Table A9 shows that for this sample, momentum is primarily an in-
traday phenomenon. Momentum has a monthly three-factor alpha of 1.45% (t-statistic of
4.43). The intraday component is 1.03% (t-statistic of 3.43), while the overnight component
is insignificant from zero (point estimate of 0.21% with a t-statistic of 0.97).
23Though the equal-weight average intraday component is statistically significant, this is driven entirely
by one country, Germany, whose financial system is known to be idiosyncratic.
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In the spirit of our international tests, we also examine whether the overnight component
becomes more important for large-cap stocks in the 1927-1962 sample. Appendix Table A9
Panel B shows that this is the case. Specifically, we find that large-cap momentum has a
monthly three-factor alpha of 1.39% (t-statistic of 4.74). The intraday component is still
large at 0.95% (t-statistic of 3.51). However, now the overnight component is statistically
significant from zero (point estimate of 0.34% with a t-statistic of 2.05). In summary, though
we have less faith in the pre-1963 open price data, we do find that the results using that
data are broadly consistent with the view that institutional investors play an important role
in understanding why momentum is an overnight phenomenon in the 1993-2013 sample.
5 Conclusions
We provide a novel decomposition of the cross section of expected returns into overnight and
intraday components. We first show remarkable persistence in the overnight and intraday
components of firm-level returns, which is consistent with clienteles persistently trading
certain types of stocks either near the open or later during the trading day. We then show
that essentially all of the abnormal returns on momentum and short-term reversal strategies
occur overnight while the abnormal returns on other strategies occur intraday and that this
pattern is not driven by news. In general, these intraday strategies also have an economically
and statistically significant overnight premium that is opposite in sign to their well-known
and often-studied total effect. Taken all together, our findings represent a challenge not
only to traditional neoclassical models of risk and return but also to intermediary- and
behavioral-based explanations of the cross section of average returns.
We document that a relatively large difference between overnight and intraday returns
reveals the extent to which investor clienteles are effectively engaged in a tug of war over the
direction of the strategy in question. We argue that if a strategy’s tug of war at some point
in time is particularly intense, the clientele trading to harvest that strategy’s anomalous
close-to-close returns is more likely to be constrained, and thus is more likely to leave part
of that strategy’s abnormal returns unexploited. Our empirical results confirm this tug of
war interpretation: A one-standard-deviation increase in a strategy’s TugOfWar forecasts
a close-to-close strategy return in the following month that is 1% higher. Our tug of war
measure thus provides a generic predictor for forecasting time-varying expected returns on
anomalies.
Finally, we zoom in on a specific form of investor heterogeneity (institutions vs individu-
als) and a specific strategy (price momentum) to understand its overnight / intraday return
patterns in detail. Relative to individuals, we show that institutions as a class (on a value-
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weight basis) tend to trade against momentum during the day. The degree to which this is
the case, however, varies through time and across stocks, generating a tug of war from intra-
day to overnight. Specifically, for those times or those stocks where the institutional holders
have a relatively strong preference to trade against momentum, we find that momentum
profits are higher overnight, partially revert intraday, and are larger close-to-close.
Though our findings originate from high frequency decompositions of returns, they have
important repercussions for investors. For one thing, given the large economic magnitudes
of our results, it is possible that trading strategies going into and out of stocks even at
this high frequency may be profitable after transaction costs for execution-savvy short-term
investors. This claim seems particularly likely for trend-following strategies we have studied
that invest in highly liquid equity index futures. Ignoring that possibility, and focusing on
long-term investors, institutions trading the anomalies at a lower frequency can nonetheless
benefit from our results by using them to optimally time their orders - at the open vs. close
of trading, depending on the strategy they are pursuing. Finally, our finding that our tug of
war measure can guide strategy timing should be of broad interest to long-horizon investors
exploiting anomalies.
Perhaps the ultimate benefit of our decomposition exercise for long-horizon investors and
researchers alike is to shed light on the causes of these anomalies —to distinguish among,
for example, risk-based vs. behavioral-based vs. institutional-friction-based explanations for
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Table I: Overnight/Intraday Return Persistence/Reversal 
 
This table reports overnight/intraday return persistence and reversal patterns. In Panel A, at the 
end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged one-month overnight 
returns. In Panel B, stocks are sorted based on their lagged one-month intraday returns. We then 
go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. The first three 
columns show the overnight return in the subsequent month of the two short-term reversal 
strategies, and the next three columns show the intraday returns in the subsequent month. Stocks 
with prices below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from 
the sample. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the 
CAPM, and by the three-factor model. We compute t-statistics, shown in parentheses, based on 
standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated 
in bold. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Sorted by One-Month Overnight Returns 
 Overnight  Intraday 
Decile Excess CAPM 3-Factor  Excess CAPM 3-Factor 
1 -1.51% -1.70% -1.73%  1.62% 1.23% 1.06% 
 (-7.76) (-9.88) (-9.77)  (4.76) (4.55) (4.15) 
10 1.96% 1.73% 1.74%  -1.63% -2.07% -1.96% 
 (8.17) (8.60) (8.69)  (-4.74) (-8.58) (-9.03) 
10 - 1 3.47% 3.42% 3.47%  -3.24% -3.30% -3.02% 
 (16.57) (16.57) (16.83)  (-9.34) (-9.00) (-9.74) 
 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Sorted by One-Month Intraday Returns 
 Overnight  Intraday 
Decile Excess CAPM 3-Factor  Excess CAPM 3-Factor 
1 1.59% 1.32% 1.35%  -1.51% -2.04% -2.14% 
 (5.51) (5.28) (5.04)  (-3.45) (-6.58) (-6.95) 
10 -0.22% -0.41% -0.42%  0.69% 0.32% 0.27% 
 (-1.20) (-2.68) (-2.64)  (2.51) (1.76) (1.57) 
10 - 1 -1.81% -1.73% -1.77%  2.19% 2.36% 2.41% 





Table II: Overnight/Intraday Return Decomposition 
 
This table reports returns to the CRSP index as well as various cross-sectional strategies during 
the day vs. at night. In the left column of the first row, we examine the overnight/intraday returns 
of the value-weight CRSP index. For the rest of the table, we report returns of long-short portfolios 
where we go long one extreme value-weight decile (quintile) and short the other extreme value-
weight decile (quintile) based on a particular firm/industry characteristic. In the right column of 
row 1, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on the prior month market 
capitalization. In row 2, stocks are sorted into decile portfolios based on lagged book-to-market 
ratio and lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month), respectively. In 
the left column of row 3, stocks are sorted into deciles based on prior quarter earnings surprises (= 
actual earnings — consensus forecast); in the right column, all industries are sorted into quintiles 
based on lagged 12-month cumulative industry returns. In row 4, stocks are sorted into deciles 
based on lagged return-to-equity and lagged asset growth, respectively. In row 5, stocks are sorted 
into deciles based on lagged 12-month market betas (using daily returns with three lags and 
summing coefficients) and lagged 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatilities (with respect to the 
Carhart four-factor model), respectively. In row 6, stocks are sorted into deciles based on equity 
issuance in the prior year and lagged discretionary accruals, respectively. In row 7, stocks are sorted 
into deciles based on lagged 12-month share turnover and lagged one month returns, respectively. 
To aid in the readability of the table, the cross-sectional strategies are designed to have positive 
average returns based on the findings in previous research. Thus, we are long small-cap stocks, 
value stocks, past one-year winners, high earnings surprise stocks, past one-month industry winners, 
high profitability, low asset growth, low beta, low idiosyncratic volatility, low equity issuance, low 
accruals, low turnover, and low past one-month losers. For example, we go long small-cap stocks 
and short large-cap stocks. Stocks with prices below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE 
size quintile are excluded from the sample. We report monthly portfolio returns adjusted by the 
CAPM in all instances except for the CRSP strategy, where we simply report excess returns. T-
statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-
dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
Overnight-Intraday Return Decomposition  
 Overnight  Intraday  Overnight  Intraday 
CRSP 0.55% 0.38% ME 0.11% 0.43% 
 (3.62) (1.87)  (0.75) (1.85) 
BM -0.10% 0.48% MOM 0.98% -0.02% 
 (-0.67) (2.21)  (3.84) (-0.06) 
SUE 0.56% 0.21% INDMOM 1.07% -0.63% 
 (3.20) (0.70)  (6.47) (-2.03) 
ROE -0.95% 1.42% INV -0.28% 0.97% 
 (-6.25) (5.58)  (-2.10) (4.39) 
BETA -0.49% 0.70% IVOL -1.46% 2.48% 
 (-2.17) (2.40)  (-5.23) (6.21) 
ISSUE -0.52% 1.13% ACCRUALS -0.47% 1.10% 
 (-3.27) (6.13)  (-3.25) (4.73) 
TURNOVER -0.29% 0.57% STR 0.93% -1.05% 




Table III: Time Series Momentum Returns 
 
This table reports returns to the time-series momentum strategy of Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012), during 
the day vs. at night for the period 1996 to 2016, for 22 equity index futures listed in Panel B. In Panel A, returns 
are calculated based on TRTH data, with intraday returns for each index calculated as the returns of the front 
futures contract, from the 30 minute VWAP centered on the “open” (defined as the minute before noon with 
the largest number of trades where trades are summed over all days), and the 30 minute VWAP centered on the 
“close” (busiest minute after noon). Overnight returns are the returns between the close on day t-1 and the open 
on day t of the front contract on date t (corresponding to rolling on expiration), with any missing data handled 
as with our equity data. Specifically, we split monthly returns exactly into intraday and overnight components, 
corresponding to returns of a strategy that aims to execute intraday and overnight round-trips, without any 
forward-looking information about which observations are available. Where there is a missing open price at date 
t, but there is a close price at date t-1, we define the overnight returns for day t as the percent price change 
between the close price at date t-1 and the first available open or close price on t or later, assuming such is 
available before contract expiration; if no such price is available, we use any one minute VWAP that is available 
on the last date before expiration; if no such price is available either, we assign zero to this overnight return 
(though this scenario is extremely rare). Similarly, if an open price is available on date t but a close price is not, 
we define intraday returns so that they correspond to the return of a position opened at the open on day t. All 
intraday, overnight or close-to-close drops of more than 30% are treated as missing, as are increases of more than 
50%, though excluding either has no qualitative effect on our results. From daily intraday, overnight and close-
to-close returns, we aggregate to monthly returns as with our TAQ stock data used in cross-sectional momentum. 
The first column reports the simple monthly average return of the strategy; Column 2 reports the CAPM alpha; 
Column 3 reports the Fama-French 3-Factor alpha; Column 4 reports the 4-Factor alpha, which also includes 
the UMD factor. The last two columns report the standard deviation and skewness of the overnight and intraday 
returns of the time-series momentum strategy. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on 
standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.  
 
Panel A: Time-Series Momentum Return Decomposition 
 Raw CAPM 3-Factor 4-Factor Stdev Skew 
Close-to-close 0.81% 1.29% 1.31% 1.50% 7.30% -0.491 
 (1.39) (2.04) (2.05) (2.42)   
Overnight 1.10% 1.40% 1.42% 1.54% 4.24% 0.178 
 (2.67) (3.24) (3.18) (3.64)   
Intraday -0.29% -0.10% -0.10% -0.04% 4.85% -2.767 








Panel B: List of Futures Contracts 
Equity Index Start Date 
AEX (Netherlands) 14-Jan-2004 
JSE (South Africa) 07-Jul-2005 
Athens LargeCap (Greece) 26-May-2000 
S&P500 MINI (U.S) 10-Sep-1997 
CAC40 (France) 07-Jan-1999 
DAX (Germany) 04-Nov-2008 
FTSE 100 (UK) 14-Nov-2001 
SMI (Switzerland) 04-Nov-2008 
HANG SENG (Hong Kong) 04-Sep-2000 
FTSE/MIB (Italy) 23-Mar-2004 
BMFBOVESPA (Brazil) 15-Dec-2009 
IPC (Mexico) 28-Jun-1999 
TOPIX (Japan) 12-Jun-2001 
KOPSI 200 (Korea) 13-Jan-1997 
IBEX35 (Spain) 09-Jan-1996 
RTS INDEX (Russia) 03-Oct-2006 
CNX NIFTY (India) 11-Oct-2005 
MSCI SINGAPORE 18-Jan-2005 
Eurostoxx 50 (Europe) 04-Nov-2008 
S&P Canada 60 10-Sep-1999 
Taiwan 14-Jun-2000 




Table IV: Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions 
 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly stocks returns on lagged firm 
characteristics. The dependent variable in the first column is the close-to-close return in the 
following month; the dependent variable in the second column is the overnight return in the 
following month, and the dependent variable in the third column is the intraday return in the 
following month. In Column 4, we report the difference between the coefficients in Columns 2 and 
3 (i.e., overnight-intraday). In Column 5, we report the difference between the overnight coefficient 
*24/17.5 and intraday coefficient *24/6.5. The independent variables include the most recent one 
month overnight return ( _ ), the most recent one month intraday return ( _ ), the 
exponentially weighted moving average ( _ ) overnight return (with a half-life to 60 
months and skipping the most recent month), the exponentially weighted moving average 
( _ ) intraday return (with a half-life to 60 months and skipping the most recent month), 
the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return (skipping the most recent month), market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatility (with regard to the 
Carhart four factor model, with one lead and one lag), 12-month market beta (using daily returns 
with three lags), 12-month share turnover, return-on-equity, asset growth, equity issuance, and 
discretionary accruals. Stocks with prices below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE 
size quintile are excluded from the sample. Stock returns are expressed in percentage terms. 
Observations are weighted by lagged market capitalization in each cross sectional regression. 
Standard errors, shown in brackets, are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, **, *** 













 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
_  -0.161 4.585*** -4.792*** 9.377*** 23.982*** 
 [0.697] [0.480] [0.574] [0.802] [2.313] 
_  -2.959*** -7.444*** 4.484*** -11.928*** -26.766*** 
 [0.686] [0.863] [0.724] [1.437] [3.546] 
_  -4.910 16.836*** -21.685*** 38.520*** 103.156*** 
 [4.228] [2.804] [4.155] [5.639] [16.852] 
_  -2.456 -15.564*** 13.583*** -29.147*** -71.499*** 
 [3.566] [4.551] [4.002] [7.849] [19.577] 
 0.232 0.640*** -0.415** 1.056*** 2.411*** 
 [0.284] [0.143] [0.186] [0.176] [0.622] 
 -0.076 0.141*** -0.227*** 0.368*** 1.031*** 
 [0.056] [0.028] [0.042] [0.045] [0.152] 
 0.028 0.148*** -0.120* 0.268*** 0.646** 
 [0.074] [0.054] [0.071] [0.102] [0.295] 
 -0.045 0.165** -0.149** 0.314*** 0.777*** 
 [0.097] [0.075] [0.063] [0.098] [0.254] 
 -0.073 0.125 -0.200* 0.325** 0.910** 
 [0.171] [0.119] [0.111] [0.151] [0.419] 
 0.102* 0.197*** -0.124*** 0.322*** 0.729*** 
 [0.061] [0.044] [0.038] [0.055] [0.147] 
 0.214 -0.214** 0.427* -0.641** -1.870** 
 [0.250] [0.105] [0.244] [0.280] [0.934] 
 -0.531** 0.001 -0.542** 0.542** 2.001*** 
 [0.210] [0.100] [0.197] [0.229] [0.752] 
 -0.878*** -0.238 -0.635*** 0.397 2.019** 
 [0.279] [0.217] [0.210] [0.327] [0.877] 
 -0.403 -0.239 -0.210 -0.029 0.447 
 [0.477] [0.283] [0.434] [0.551] [1.703] 
      
Adj-R2 0.128 0.106 0.135   





Table V: Forecasting Close-to-Close Factor Returns 
 
This table reports regressions of close-to-close factor returns on lagged return differentials between 
the overnight and intraday components of the same factor. The dependent variable in each row is 
the monthly return to a factor portfolio (top decile minus bottom decile), and the independent 
variable of interest is TugOfWar, defined in equation (1) of Section 4.4. Specifically, a strategy’s 
TugOfWar is the appropriately signed lagged difference between the exponentially weighted moving 
average (EWMA) of the intraday component and the EWMA of the overnight component of that 
strategy (as equation (1) details, for the two strategies which have their premia earned overnight, 
MOM and STR, we instead subtract the intraday EWMA from the overnight EWMA). We use a 
half-life of 60 months in the EWMA. We also include in the regression a corresponding EWMA of 
the lagged factor return, and that of lagged monthly factor volatility. Other controls include the 
lagged 12-month market return and market volatility, the characteristic spread between the 
strategy’s long leg and short leg, and the difference in short interest between the strategy’s long leg 
and short leg. In row 1, stocks are sorted into deciles based on the lagged 12 month cumulative 
return; in row 2, stocks are sorted into deciles based on the lagged market capitalization; in row 3, 
stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged book-to-market ratio; in row 4, stocks are sorted into 
deciles based on lagged profitability; in row 5 stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged asset 
growth; in row 6, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged 12-month market betas (using daily 
returns with three lags and summing coefficients); in row 7, stocks are sorted into deciles based on 
their lagged 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatilities (with regard to the Carhart four factor model); 
in row 8, stocks are sorted into deciles based on equity issuance in the prior year; in row 9, stocks 
are sorted into deciles based on lagged discretionary accruals; in row 10, stocks are sorted into 
deciles based on lagged 12-month share turnover; in row 11, stocks are sorted into deciles based on 
lagged one month returns. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard 
errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
A statistical test of the null hypothesis that the forecasting coefficients on TugOfWar in these 
eleven regressions are jointly zero is easily rejected (p< 0.01). 
 
Depvar = Factor Returnt+1 
 TugOfWart Factor Returnt Factor Volt 
 1.967 (2.48) 0.001 (0.00) -1.189 (-1.46) 
 1.027 (1.57) 0.557 (1.01) -1.207 (-1.18) 
 -0.074 (-0.12) -0.314 (-0.39) 1.212 (1.30) 
 1.100 (2.47) -1.255 (-1.29) 1.279 (1.62) 
 1.339 (1.93) -1.061 (-1.32) 0.821 (1.04) 
 1.340 (1.18) 0.024 (0.03) -0.427 (-0.58) 
 1.207 (2.11) -1.228 (-1.33) 1.842 (1.76) 
 2.277 (2.86) -5.258 (-4.00) 0.281 (0.41) 
 0.470 (0.95) -1.197 (-1.30) 2.045 (3.62) 
 2.098 (3.53) -0.901 (-0.93) 0.858 (0.95) 





Table VI: Institutional Trading and Contemporaneous Returns 
 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of changes in institutional ownership on 
contemporaneous stock returns. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of shares 
outstanding held by all institutional investors. The independent variable in Column 1 is the 
cumulative overnight return measured in the contemporaneous period, and that in Column 2 is the 
cumulative intraday return in the same period. Column 3 reports the difference between the 
coefficients on overnight vs. intraday cumulative returns. Panel A uses quarterly changes in 
institutional ownership as reported in 13-F filings. Panel B uses daily changes in institutional 
ownership as inferred from large trades in the TAQ database (following Campbell, Ramadorai and 
Schwartz, 2008). Stocks with prices below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size 
quintile are excluded from the sample. We further sort stocks into five quintiles based on 
institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter and conduct the same regression for each 
IO quintile. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Quarterly Change in IO 
DepVar = Contemporaneous Qtrly Change in Institutional Ownership 
IO Overnight Return Intraday Return 
Overnight —
Intraday 
1 -0.003 0.030* -0.033 
 [0.007] [0.017] [0.022] 
5 -0.008 0.070*** -0.077*** 
 [0.006] [0.010] [0.006] 
5-1 -0.005 0.039* -0.044* 
 [0.008] [0.023] [0.027] 
 
Panel B: Daily Change in IO 
DepVar = Contemporaneous Daily Change in Institutional Ownership 
IO Overnight Return Intraday Return 
Overnight —
Intraday 
1 0.177*** 0.159*** 0.018 
 [0.041] [0.019] [0.040] 
5 0.130*** 1.254*** -1.123*** 
 [0.039] [0.116] [0.104] 
5-1 -0.047 1.095*** -1.141*** 





Table VII: Momentum Trading 
 
This table examines the potential role of institutions’ momentum trading. Panel A reports two-
stage Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of changes in institutional ownership on the 
momentum characteristic. The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in the fraction of 
shares outstanding held by all institutional investors (as reported in 13F filings) in the subsequent 
quarter and the independent variable is the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return. In the second 
stage, we regress the time-series of first stage momentum coefficients on a constant and on our 
measure of arbitrage trading in the momentum strategy, COMOM, a tercile dummy ranging from 
0 to 2 that is constructed from comomentum, defined as the average pairwise partial return 
correlation in the loser decile ranked in the previous 12 months. We estimate both stages by OLS 
in the first two columns and by WLS (with weights proportional to lagged market capitalization) 
in the next two columns. Changes in institutional ownership are expressed in percentage terms. 
Panels B and C report, respectively, the overnight and intraday returns to the momentum strategy 
as a function of lagged comomentum. All months in our sample are classified into three groups 
based on comomentum. Reported in these two panels are the overnight/intraday returns to the 
momentum strategy (i.e., long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser 
decile) in the two years after portfolio formation, following low to high COMOM. Stocks with prices 
below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. 
Standard errors are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. R2 (1st stage) is the average R2 of 
all the cross-sectional regressions from the first stage (as in other tables with Fama-MacBeth 
regressions) and is therefore constant across the second stage specifications estimated with the same 
method. R2 (2nd stage) is the R2 from the forecasting regression of Fama-MacBeth coefficients on 
COMOM. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: DepVar = Subsequent Change in Institutional Ownership 
X 100 
Second stage regression forecasting the Fama-
MacBeth coefficients 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 OLS WLS 
Constant 0.189 -0.240 -0.260** -0.737** 
 [0.117] [0.215] [0.119] [0.317] 
COMOM  0.199**  0.233* 
  [0.088]  [0.125] 
       
Adj-R2 (1st stage) 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Adj-R2 (2st stage)  0.022  0.021 







Panel B: Overnight Momentum Returns 
COMOM  Year 1 Year 2 
Rank No Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
1 72 1.14% (4.76) 0.95% (3.80) 
2 72 1.04% (4.41) -0.03% (-0.10) 
3 72 -0.41% (-0.61) -1.30% (-3.02) 
3-1  -1.56% (-2.22) -2.26% (-4.05) 
 
 
Panel C: Intraday Momentum Returns 
COMOM  Year 1 Year 2 
Rank No Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
1 72 -0.92% (-2.95) -0.62% (-3.12) 
2 72 -0.84% (-2.09) -0.70% (-1.40) 
3 72 0.19% (0.36) 0.24% (0.42) 







Table VIII: Rebalancing Trades 
 
This table examines the potential role of institutions’ rebalancing trades. Panel A reports Fama-
MacBeth forecasting regressions of changes in institutional ownership on the momentum 
characteristic. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of shares outstanding held by 
all institutional investors (as reported in 13F filings) in the subsequent quarter. The main 
independent variable is the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return. We also include in the 
regression AWGHT, a quintile dummy constructed each quarter based on the active weight of the 
aggregate institutional portfolio (i.e., the aggregate weight of all institutions in a stock minus that 
in the market portfolio), as well as the interaction term between AWGHT and the lagged 12-month 
return. We estimate OLS in the first two columns and WLS (with weights proportional to lagged 
market capitalization) in the next two columns. Panels B and C report, respectively, the overnight 
and intraday returns to the momentum strategy as a function of institutional active weight. In 
particular, in each month, stocks are sorted independently into a 5X5 matrix by both institutional 
AWGHT from the most recent quarter and lagged 12-month stock returns. Reported in these two 
panels are the overnight/intraday returns to the momentum strategy (i.e., long the value-weight 
winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile) in the following month. Stocks with prices 
below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. 
Standard errors are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: DepVar = Subsequent Change in Institutional Ownership 
X 100 Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 OLS WLS 
MOM 0.189 0.620*** -0.260** 0.210* 
 [0.117] [0.128] [0.119] [0.114] 
MOM X AWGHT  -0.182***  -0.143*** 
  [0.043]  [0.046] 
AWGHT  -0.292***  -0.178*** 
  [0.022]  [0.015] 
       
Adj-R2 0.003 0.015 0.004 0.017 







Panel B: Overnight MOM Returns 
 Institutional Active Weight 
MOM 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
1 0.52% 0.00% -0.07% -0.08% -0.27% -0.79% 
 (1.91) (0.01) (-0.33) (-0.39) (-1.21) (-4.32) 
5 0.79% 0.53% 0.44% 0.67% 1.15% 0.36% 
 (4.31) (2.60) (2.22) (3.64) (6.66) (3.37) 
5 — 1 0.27% 0.53% 0.51% 0.75% 1.42% 1.15% 
 (1.10) (2.68) (2.72) (4.54) (7.92) (5.39) 
 
 
Panel C: Intraday MOM Returns 
 Institutional Active Weight 
MOM 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
1 -0.36% 0.18% 0.71% 0.51% 0.38% 0.74% 
 (-0.92) (0.43) (1.63) (1.23) (1.03) (3.03) 
5 -0.44% 0.44% 0.55% 0.24% -0.46% -0.02% 
 (-1.71) (1.45) (1.81) (0.87) (-1.89) (-0.14) 
5 — 1 -0.09% 0.26% -0.16% -0.27% -0.84% -0.76% 









Figure 1: This figure shows dollar trading volume over 30-minute intervals throughout the trading 
day. In particular, we first sum up the amount of dollars traded in each of these half-hour windows. 
We then compute the fraction of total daily volume (i.e., the sum over these 13 windows) that is 
accounted for by each 30-minute interval. In other words, these red bars sum up to 1. The first 
half-hour window that starts at 9:30am also includes the open auction. The last half-hour window 


















Figure 2: This figure shows the t-statistics of the overnight/intraday return persistence test, as 
reported in Table VI. We extend our analysis in Table VI by varying the lag between the ranking 
period and holding period from one month all the way to sixty months (i.e., as shown by the X-
axis). Stocks with prices below $5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are 
excluded from the sample. The dotted green curve corresponds to using lagged overnight returns to 
forecast future overnight returns. The dashed orange curve corresponds to using lagged intraday 
returns to forecast future intraday returns. The dashed blue curve corresponds to using lagged 
overnight returns to forecast future intraday returns. Finally, the dashed red curve corresponds to 

































Figure 3: This figure shows dollar trading volume of large (depicted by blue bars) vs. small orders 
(depicted by red bars) over 30-minute intervals throughout the trading day for the period 1993-
2000. We define small orders as those below $5,000 and large orders as those above $50,000. More 
specifically, we first sum up the amount of dollars traded in each of these half-hour windows. We 
then compute the fraction of total daily volume (i.e., the sum over these 13 windows) that is 
accounted for by each 30-minute interval. In other words, both the red bars and blue bars sum up 
to 1. The first half-hour window that starts at 9:30am also includes the open auction. The last half-
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